Interactive material for history lessons — an analytical approach from geopolitics to heritage
Understanding the Rapallo border requires knowledge of the post-war diplomatic reorganisation of Europe. The Paris Peace Conference (January 1919 – January 1920) redrawn the borders between the victorious and defeated powers through a series of treaties. Three factors were decisive for the position of Slovenes: the London Pact of 1915, Italian domestic political rhetoric, and the severely weakened position of the Kingdom of SCS.
Italy entered the First World War in April 1915 on the side of the Entente on the basis of the London Pact — a secret treaty that promised it, in exchange for entering the conflict, extensive territories: Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, part of Dalmatia and a large part of western Slovenia. After the war these expectations were only partially fulfilled at the Paris Conference — particularly regarding Rijeka and most of Dalmatia.
The rhetoric of the "mutilated victory" quickly became the driving force of nationalist-Fascist mobilisation in Italy. The government was under intense pressure to "rectify" what had been lost in Paris — at the expense of the Kingdom of SCS.
The Kingdom of SCS arrived at the negotiations in an exceptionally weakened diplomatic position:
What were the structural weaknesses in the negotiating position of the Kingdom of SCS in November 1920? Which of the factors listed seems most important to you, and why?
What did the phrase "vittoria mutilata" mean in the Italian post-war discourse?
Which treaty was signed on 10 October 1920 — 33 days BEFORE the Treaty of Rapallo — and how did it affect the negotiating position of the Kingdom of SCS?
Direct negotiations between Italy and the Kingdom of SCS began on 8 November 1920 and concluded with the signing of the border treaty on 12 November 1920 in Villa Spinola (today Villa Pagana) in Rapallo near Genoa.
⚠ None of the delegates was Slovenian — even though Slovenes made up the majority of the affected population. The first elections in the Kingdom of SCS were held only on 28 November 1920.
The treaty defined the course of the border from the triple border with Austria to the Kvarner — approximately 230 km in total. Precise demarcation was left to the joint demarcation commission (1921–1925). In addition to the border line, the treaty regulated the establishment of the Free State of Rijeka.
The treaty contained no formal guarantees for the rights of the Slovenian and Croatian population in Italy. Foreign Minister Sforza even declared that "a state with a rich cultural tradition does not need written guarantees for minorities." While the parliamentary chamber did pass a resolution on the protection of the Slavic population, it had no legal force and soon proved an empty promise.
In the Italian parliament 253 deputies voted for ratification, 14 against, and 50 abstained. Those who voted against were nationalists and Fascists — because the treaty had not awarded Italy Dalmatia and Rijeka. Those who abstained were Italian socialists — because the treaty contained no reciprocal minority guarantees.
Italy was prepared to accept two scenarios: either full implementation of the London Pact (which would have meant the annexation of most of Dalmatia as well) or a compromise proposal with the abandonment of Dalmatian claims. The Kingdom of SCS delegation chose the compromise: in exchange for retaining most of Dalmatia (excluding Zadar and most of the islands), it agreed to a demarcation that handed the entire western Slovenian territory and part of Istria to Italy.
It was therefore a diplomatic exchange: Dalmatia for the Littoral. Slovenes were the consequence of this exchange — even though they had no voice in the decision.
Among the signatories of the Treaty of Rapallo in 1920 was Ivanoe Bonomi — at the time Minister of War of the Kingdom of Italy, one of the three negotiators who accepted and signed the treaty without minority guarantees. In 1947 the same Bonomi appeared at the Paris Peace Conference — this time as President of the Italian Senate, who had to confront Italy with the consequences of that very treaty. It is rare in diplomatic history for the same person to stand on both sides of the same question — the signatory and the one explaining what he signed.
Why was no Slovenian present in the Kingdom of SCS delegation, even though Slovenes made up the majority of the affected territory?
What key protection did the treaty omit for the Slovenian minority in Italy?
Once the border was demarcated (joint commission 1921–1925, 58 sectors with Roman numerals), both states established a system of border control and monitoring. In the 1930s, as international tensions escalated, this system was expanded with extensive defensive fortifications.
The joint border commission with Italian and Yugoslav representation precisely demarcated the border on the ground between 1921 and 1925. Border stones with the Roman numeral of the sector were erected. In case of disagreement the president of the Swiss Confederation would have the final say — but this did not come to pass.
During the commission's work a dispute arose over Triglav. By the technical criteria of demarcation the summit should have fallen on the Yugoslav side, but in 1923 Italy, through diplomatic pressure, secured its award to itself. For Slovenes this was not merely a geographical point — Triglav is the central symbol of the Slovenian nation, today depicted on the coat of arms of the Republic of Slovenia. It remained under Italy until 1947, when the Paris Peace Treaty returned it, together with most of the Primorska region, to Yugoslavia. The dispute over Triglav is a vivid example that the border was not created only technically — it was also created politically.
After 1933, as the international situation grew more tense, both sides built extensive defensive systems along the border.
What was the purpose of the MVSN (Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale) along the Rapallo border?
Why did both sides of the Rapallo border build extensive defensive fortifications in the 1930s?
The Rapallo border was not hermetically sealed. It was regulated by a network of bilateral agreements on border traffic, while at the same time being economically absolutely relevant for the border population — which led to widespread illegal crossing.
The basis for the legal regulation of border traffic was established by the Nettuno Conventions of 1925. This was followed by the Belgrade Agreement, which regulated in greater detail the categories of crossing, permits and the rights of border inhabitants. The system recognised several categories:
Despite the legal framework, the border was in practice permeable in the unauthorised direction — through smuggling, which locals called kontrabant. The reasons for the prevalence of smuggling were structural:
The mountain section of the Rapallo border was particularly interesting. Hikers and mountain guides knew every path and every stream confluence. Alpine clubs on both sides of the border were under special surveillance by the authorities, because mountain paths offered potential illegal corridors.
Italy sought to restrict the movement of hikers in the mountain belt along the border in some sections. But the hills depended on local knowledge — strangers without guides were lost, while locals knew every hidden trail. This informal "mountain power" remained in the hands of the local population.
Is smuggling along the Rapallo border merely a criminal phenomenon, or should it be viewed as a form of resistance or economic survival? Argue from the perspective of historical context.
Parallel to TIGR, a different form of resistance operated — not with weapons, but with the written word. The Black Brothers (Fratelli Neri in Italian police documentation) were a secret youth organisation that distributed banned Slovenian literature among Primorska students and workers. They carried books hidden in hollow shoe soles, beneath their clothing and in the false bottoms of suitcases. They sustained reading in Slovenian, the singing of Slovenian songs in private homes, and contacts among peers whom school and the street pushed towards an Italian identity.
A comparison with TIGR is analytically productive here: both organisations operated illegally, both risked arrest, but their means and aims differed. If TIGR defended Slovenian identity with weapons, the Black Brothers defended its cultural foundation — with the word, with song and with the book. Without this cultural fabric, the armed resistance would soon have been left isolated.
Which bilateral agreement of 1925 legally regulated the categories of border crossings between Italy and the Kingdom of SCS?
Which structural factor contributed most to the prevalence of smuggling along the Rapallo border?
Under the Treaty of Rapallo, approximately 325,000 Slovenes and ~150,000 Croats came under Italy. The Fascist regime began a systematic policy of denationalisation — Italianisation (italianizzazione). The aim was not merely administrative integration, but the radical transformation of the ethnic and linguistic profile of the acquired territories.
In response to Fascist oppression, the national defence organisation TIGR was founded in 1927 (Trieste, Istria, Gorizia, Rijeka). The organisation carried out acts of sabotage, gathered intelligence and maintained contacts with Yugoslavia. It operated illegally under a repressive system.
Ferdo Bidovec, Fran Marušič, Alojz Valenčič and Zvonimir Miloš were sentenced to death at the first Trieste trial before the Special Tribunal for the Defence of the State (Tribunale Speciale per la Difesa dello Stato). They were shot at Basovizza in 1930. In Slovenian national memory they became symbols of resistance — crucially, they were not convicted for a specific murder, but for organising themselves into a resistance structure.
A choirmaster from Gorizia who led church choirs and thereby maintained Slovenian in the liturgical space. In December 1936, Fascists forced a mixture of petrol and machine oil down his throat. After weeks of suffering he died on 16 February 1937. The Bratuž case is cited in international historical sources as a documented example of Nazi-Fascist cultural repression.
When the school reform of 1923 forced Slovenian out of the classrooms, the response came from homes and parish houses. Secret schools sprang up in cellars, in attics and behind churches — local priests, retired teachers and educated farmers secretly taught children to read and write in their mother tongue. Arrest meant a fine or imprisonment. Even so, the schools operated, because the communities understood that language is a precondition for the survival of a nation.
The Catholic Church occupied a special position in this space — the Slovenian clergy had deep roots in the Primorska region and preserved the liturgy at least partly in Slovenian, which became one of the few sanctuaries of the living language in the public sphere. This is precisely why the attack on Bratuž became so symbolically shocking: they attacked not a fighter, but a singer — because he had the courage to sing in Slovenian.
A Primorska poet, born in Sežana, who died at the age of twenty-two. Most of his poems were published only after his death — and in conditions where Slovenian was banned in the Primorska region, the manuscripts circulated among Primorska Slovenes like smuggled goods. Kosovel himself was not a political activist, but his legacy became part of the cultural resistance: proof that Slovenian literary creation lived on despite the ban, not merely as folklore, but as serious contemporary art.
After Slovenian independence, the governments of both countries established a mixed Slovenian-Italian cultural-historical commission in 1993. After seven years of work it unanimously adopted in 2000 the joint report Slovenian-Italian Relations 1880–1956.
The report was prepared unanimously, including by Italian historians — yet official Italian politics never ratified it nor proclaimed it an official historical document, even though that was precisely the original intention behind establishing the commission.
This report is regarded as the fundamental scholarly basis for understanding Slovenian-Italian relations of this period.
Which element of the Italianisation policy was most fateful for the Slovenian community in terms of long-term denationalisation?
Before which body were the Basovizza heroes (Bidovec, Marušič, Valenčič, Miloš) convicted in 1930?
Fascist Italy on 6 April 1941, together with Nazi Germany, attacked the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. For Slovenia the attack meant the carving up of its territory into four parts between different forces. Italy occupied central Slovenia and annexed it as the Provincia di Lubiana.
Italian authorities in the Province of Ljubljana implemented a systematic war-criminal policy: collective punishments, burning of villages, arrests, deportations. 25,000–30,000 Slovenes were deported to concentration camps, mostly civilians, women and children. The most important camps were Rab (Kampor) and Gonars — on Rab alone approximately 1,200 Slovenes died, among them more than a hundred children.
As a direct response to the violence, the Liberation Front of the Slovenian Nation was founded on 27 April 1941, uniting the resistance movement under the leadership of Communists, liberals and Christian socialists.
Directly responsible for the systematic violence in the Province of Ljubljana was General Mario Roatta, commander of the 2nd Italian Army. He issued a directive that formalised collective punishments — the burning of villages and the shooting of hostages as a systemic response to every act of resistance. After the war Roatta was charged with war crimes in Italy. In 1945 he escaped from prison. The conviction was overturned in 1948. He was never punished.
For Slovenes, Roatta is not merely a historical name — he is a symbol of an unsettled account. The question he raises remains relevant today: how does a democratic state confront the war crimes of its own generals? Italy answered this question with silence and annulment. This is part of the reason why the joint Slovenian-Italian historical report of 2000, despite unanimous scholarly support, never became an official state document.
Following Italy's capitulation on 8 September 1943, German soldiers occupied the territories previously controlled by Italy. For the Littoral Slovenes this meant the replacement of one repressive system with another.
In May 1945 the units of the NOV/POJ together with the western Allies liberated the Littoral and Trieste. But the resolution of the border question was deferred:
British General W. D. Morgan, following unsuccessful negotiations with Marshal Tito (8–9 May 1945), established a demarcation line between Allied and Yugoslav administration:
The definitive settlement was left to the peace conference.
Which organisation did the Slovenian resistance movement found on 27 April 1941 as a direct response to Italian violence?
Why did the western Allies (Great Britain, USA) not hand over the entire Littoral to Yugoslavia immediately after liberation in 1945?
The Paris Peace Treaty was signed on 10 February 1947 and entered into force on 15 September of that year. It abolished the Rapallo regime of 1920 and most of the Littoral returned to Yugoslavia.
At the Paris Peace Conference the border was debated on the basis of three different proposals:
The French proposal was adopted. The Slovenian delegation, which appeared in Paris with historical and demographic arguments, thus for the first time in this process actually helped to shape the outcome — in contrast to 1920, when the decision on Slovenian territory was made without a single Slovenian representative.
The treaty did not resolve everything: Trieste with its surroundings became the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT) under UN administration. The arrangement was temporary — the London Memorandum of 1954 divided the FTT: the city of Trieste with the western strip came under Italy, while the remaining territory (the Littoral part) remained in Yugoslavia. Italy and Yugoslavia formally recognised the definitive border only with the Osimo Agreements of 1975.
Slovenia had serious representation at the negotiations in Paris. The head of the delegation was Edvard Kardelj. Among the delegates were Dr Aleš Bebler, Dr Drago Marušič and Dr Joža Vilfan. Among the experts were historians Dr Bogo Grafenauer and Dr Fran Zwitter. Unlike the Rapallo negotiations of 1920, Slovenes this time had actual representation and professionally prepared arguments.
The Rapallo period has remained a subject of historical and diplomatic tensions. Italy, by Law No. 92/2004, commemorates every year on 10 February the victims of the foibe killings and the Istrian exodus. Historian Eric Gobetti points out that after the war the Italian authorities systematically protected war criminals and cultivated the myth of "good Italians" — a selective memory that emphasises one's own victims while simultaneously ignoring the crimes that caused those victims.
Why was the joint Slovenian-Italian historical report (2000) unanimously signed by all members of the commission (including the Italian ones), but was never officially confirmed by the official Italian government? What does this tell us about the relationship between academic history and the politics of historical memory?
The Rapallo border was a 27-year wound in the Slovenian national fabric. Its significance for Slovenian history is multifaceted:
When did Italy and Yugoslavia formally and legally recognise the border determined in 1947?
What is the fundamental difference between the Treaty of Rapallo (1920) and the Paris Peace Treaty (1947) regarding the representation of the Slovenian people?
The Rapallo border (1920–1947) was the product of a specific convergence of the diplomatic weakness of the Kingdom of SCS, Italian expansionism and the absence of international guarantees for minorities. Over 27 years it tested the resilience of the Slovenian people and left a deep mark on the demographic, cultural and identity profile of the Littoral region.
Its significance is not merely historical: the culture of memory, the diplomatic framework and questions of historical injustice remained relevant in Slovenian-Italian relations right up to the end of the 20th century. The Rapallo period is a paradigmatic example of how borders do not merely divide territories — they divide communities, identities and fates.
